

R E M A R K S, &c.

[PRICE ONE SHILLING.]



R E M A R K S

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GEN. HOWE's ACCOUNT

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OF HIS PROCEEDINGS ON

L O N G - I S L A N D,

IN THE

EXTRAORDINARY GAZETTE

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OCTOBER 10, 1776:

(By Israel Mann)

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R E M A R K S, &c.

UPON any undue miscarriage in our sea or land service, every man's love of justice, and regard for the public interest, will lead him to wish, that wheresoever the fault lay, there may fall the public censure and disgrace: That the innocent may not suffer, and that the guilty may not escape. If a measure have been originally wrong and ill concerted, or was in itself too hazardous or impracticable; and we lay upon the commander the blame of not having succeeded in it, we may lose a good general, and retain a bad minister. If, on the other hand the measure, as originally planned, was right and proper, and we blame the minister, because the general

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misbehaved in the execution, in that case we may lose a good minister, and retain a bad commander. Every honest man must see, that the public interest is much concerned in the making this necessary distinction.

The conduct of all oppositions is a little different. In every miscarriage, their invariable rule of practice has been to justify the commander, and to lay the blame on the minister. And the reason is manifest. The leaders in an opposition don't want to be generals or admirals, but ministers: the disgracing of a commander therefore does not answer their purpose; it rather strengthens an administration, and sets their competitors so much farther off their aim.

Far from feeling therefore any concern for their country, and expressing a just resentment at any misconduct in the commanders;

manders; they hold themselves rather obliged to them for disgracing the service; and furnishing them with a fresh ground of attack upon their rivals.

Upon the miscarriage at Carthagená, in the year 1741, the popular clamour, and the cry of opposition was against the ministers: who, they said, had *starved* the war, and *tied up the hands of the commanders*. It appeared afterwards, from their own letters, which Vernon published, that the leaders in opposition knew at the time the falsehood of this charge. But it served their purpose to give it out; and the people were made to believe it.

Upon Admiral Byng's misbehaviour at the opening of the last war, the opposition of that time took the part of the Admiral: and threw the whole blame upon the minister

at home. They condemned the administration for not sending out a greater force; and yet justified the Admiral, who kept himself and one half of that force out of the action; and left Mr. West with the other half to fight the whole of the French. The reader will recollect that Mr. Pitt told the House, in his own favourite and absurd idiom, he found no *criminality in Mr. Byng*. And why should he? Mr. Pitt did not wish to be a sea-commander; his aim was at the Duke of Newcastle, and at the first Lord of the Admiralty. He therefore could not be angry with Mr. Byng, who gave him so good a chance for over-setting them.

Mr. Pitt himself, when he came to be minister, upon the misconduct at Rochfort, experienced something of the same kind. But as the Newcastle party had, as he said,

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lent him their majority, the opposition was too feeble to make head against him.

If this reasoning be just, and the reader see the necessity of distinguishing between the different functions of the minister and the commander, I think the following rule will enable him to judge upon the merits of each. If in projecting any distant expedition, a minister shall have formed a good and proper plan, and furnished a sufficient force for the execution of it, he has discharged his part, and done all that is incumbent upon him. The manner of making use of that force, and of carrying the plan into execution, that lies with the commander.

Let us carry this rule in our minds, and reflect upon the measures planned at home,
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and the operations of our generals in America.

At the time when Lord George Germaine became secretary, the British interest in America was at its lowest ebb. A rebellion had for some years been going on there, without any effectual measures having been taken to suppress it. Our troops had been suffered for a year together to be ingloriously pent up in Boston; and at length to be still more ingloriously driven out of it. The whole American empire was reduced to Halifax and Quebec. St. John's and Fort Chambly had been taken, and all the regular forces made prisoners. Montreal and the rest of Canada was in the possession of the rebels; and Quebec itself was besieged; without any regular troops, and with only townsmen and sailors to defend it. Here in England we had the greatest reason to think
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that it was taken : and it was at last saved by little less than a miracle.

In this low state of our affairs, Lord George Germaine took the seals ; and gave a vigour to our councils unknown to them before. By engaging a large body of foreign troops, and sending the earliest succour up the river St. Lawrence, the whole of Canada was recovered, a fleet was built at St. John's, and the rebels were beaten from off the lakes.

General Howe then, for the first time, began to look the enemy in the face ; and well he might : at the head of between twenty and thirty thousand men, and attended by a great fleet, he was enabled to land on Long-Island, with a force superior in *number*, and much more in *discipline*,
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to that which opposed him. By a just disposition, the out-posts were all forced; ten thousand of the rebels, as the General himself counts them, were defeated; beside the killed, wounded, and drowned, eleven hundred of them were made prisoners, and the rest fled with the utmost precipitation into the lines, pursued by the victors close up to their trenches. Filled with all the ardour of success, the troops would instantly have entered their camp, when the General thought he had, for that day at least, done the rebel army damage enough; and chose to give them time to recover from their fright. See his own account of this affair. “ As soon as these corps had passed the heights, they halted, for the soldiers to take a little refreshment; after which the march was continued, and about half an hour after eight o'clock, having got to Bedford, in

the rear of the enemy's left, the attack was commenced by the light-infantry and light-dragoons, upon large bodies of the rebels, having cannon, who were quitting the woody heights before-mentioned, to return to their lines, upon discovering the march of the army ; instead of which they were driven back, and the army still moving on to gain the enemy's rear, the grenadiers and 33d regiment being in front of the column, soon approached within musquet-shot of the enemy's lines at Brooklyn : from whence these battalions, without regard to the fire of cannon and small arms upon them, pursued numbers of the rebels that were retiring from the heights, so close to their principal redoubt, and with such eagerness to attack it by storm, that it required repeated orders to prevail upon them to desist from the attempt. Had they been permitted to

go on, it is my opinion they would have carried the redoubt; but as it was apparent the lines must have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular approaches, I would not risque the loss that might have been sustained in the assault, and ordered them back to a hollow way, in the front of the works, out of the reach of musquetry."

Can the reader wonder, that the troops were thus eager for the attack, and that it required repeated orders to prevail upon them to desist, when the General himself was of opinion, and every other man plainly saw, that the lines must have been forced, and the whole rebel army taken or destroyed?

Even without any previous defeat, the army which attacks another in their trenches, is generally thought to have the advantage.

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The confidence inspired by the marching to attack, and the consciousness in the defenders of their not being able to meet their enemy upon equal terms, generally gives the victory to the assailants. But there is scarce an instance to be found, of a defeated army precipitately flying into their trenches, ever defending them against a victorious army of near double their number.

The French generals ascribed their losing the battle of Turin to their staying behind their lines ; Prince Eugene had certainly never won it, if, when he had got up to them, he had delayed the attack, and had thought only of besieging them with regular approaches. King William lost the battle of Landen by trusting to his lines, which Marshal Luxemburgh attacked as soon as he came up to them, without giving him time

to cross the river in the night and escape him.

Had the commander in chief chosen to follow the judgment of the other generals, and stormed the lines, the rebel army was at their mercy, and the war would have been at an end. The terror of the foreign troops was then fresh; and operated in its full force; and the rebels never would have got men to enlist in another army to oppose them. Was it the fault of the ministers at home, that the rebellion was not brought to so happy a period?

We readily allow the merit of all the dispositions made for coming at the rebel camp, and that the loss of between three and four hundred men was as little as could be expected, in the dislodging

ging of ten thousand from their several out-posts, and driving them with precipitation into their lines. But to little purpose surely was there any loss at all incurred, in order to force their way up to their camp, if we were to do nothing when we came there.

The General himself tells us, that his troops approached within musquet-shot of the lines; and, without regarding the fire of the cannon and small arms, pursued numbers of the rebels so close to their principal redoubt, as to be in the utmost eagerness to storm it, and nothing but his repeated orders could prevail with them to desist. The danger of the approach therefore was already overcome: the rebels had tried the fire of their cannon and musquetry without effect: the army were close at the

heels of the runaways ; the end of all the former attacks was answered ; when a sudden stop was put to the crowning victory which lay before them.

Was it the minister that suggested the giving up all these advantages, by calling off the troops in the midst of victory, and the hiding them in a hollow-way, out of the reach of musquet-shot ? and then, after two days delay, deliberately opening trenches at six hundred yards distance ?

From this slow and solemn preparation we might think, that these lines were as strong as those of Donawert ; which yet the Duke of Malborough stormed the same evening that he came up to them. But did we ever hear of a great and victorious army's being
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stopped in the midst of conquest, for forming regular approaches against the ditch of a line, which was three miles long, and only three or four feet deep? Did not the rebel fugitives run over the ditch and breast-work, wherever their pursuers suffered them? and could not British troops as easily have followed them? Were these lines guarded by any such rocky precipices, as those which the Hessians stormed at fort Washington? Had the redoubt, for which the success of twenty thousand victors was stopped, a tenth part of the strength that nature and art had given to fort Montgomery? which yet General Clinton stormed, with one quarter of that number; and availing himself of the terror struck by his having driven in all their out posts, took by a *coup de main*, without losing three minutes upon regular approaches.

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But the General would not risk the loss that might have been sustained in the assault. Twice has this gentleman, with his forward movements, led us to suppose, that he was going to attack the rebel army in their camp. He therefore would have us believe, that, without any previous defeat, their army being entire, and standing behind their lines, that even in that state they might be assaulted and forced. He found, however, no part of the camp that was vulnerable, and came back again. Had either of these forward movements against the enemy, with which the General opened and closed the last campaign, taken place, and been attended, as he hoped, with the success due to the spirit and activity of his Majesty's troops, yet he could not expect to force the lines, without considerable loss. Nor did he here chuse to make trial of the method, so perfectly new in the modern art of war,

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of opening trenches before an army, and besieging their lines with regular approaches. But when ten thousand of the rebel army in Long-Island had been routed, and one-third of them, with their three generals, were killed, wounded, or taken ; and when the rest of them were flying into swamps and seas to escape him, he then checks the ardor of his troops, and sends repeated orders for them to desist, because he would not risk the loss, that might have been sustained in the assault.

Here was a part of the rebel lines which was confessedly *vulnerable* : the General himself acknowledges it, and all the other officers saw it : but he did not chuse then to assault it. The immediate forcing of their lines must have been the total ruin of the rebel army : but the General is *unwilling to risk the loss*

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that might have been sustained in the assault, gives repeated orders to stop the pursuit, and after two days rest, breaks ground and begins his regular approaches,

I well know, that the ten thousand men which were defeated, was not the whole of the rebel army; altho' the three generals who commanded them were all taken, yet that General Putnam with some few thousands remained within the lines: but can it be imagined, that these men, when they saw the far greater part of their army defeated, and precipitately flying into the lines for shelter, with the victors at their heels, and many of the fugitives, without staying to defend the lines, running a mile farther down to their boats in the sea, could it be supposed, that the minds of these remaining rebels would be at ease? and that they

they would not in any degree partake of the general consternation? Could the cannon have distinguished between friends and foes, if the troops had been allowed to enter the lines along with the run-aways.

Whose lives they were that *we* were thus tender of, cannot be known: but of this we may be very sure; that the loss of a hundred men, which other generals thought would be the greatest they could sustain in forcing the camp; and that the putting an end to the war, by the deletion of the rebel army, would have been the saving of ten thousand brave men's lives, which have been lost by protracting it,

But it was apparent, we are told, that the lines must have been ours at a very

cheap rate by regular approaches.—Doubtless they would be so.—But could it be supposed, that the defeated army's fears would not be as quick-sighted to discern their danger, as the victor General's hopes in his deliberate precautions? Cheap therefore as the rate was, at which he proposed to gain the lines by regular approaches, they helped him to a much cheaper one: and that was, to move off and leave them to him.—Was it possible not to expect this? Had the army been so long in Staten-Island, and not known the common market-ferry from Brooklyn to New-York? Were not the same boats, which carried the rebel army from New-York to Long-Island, lying ready to bring them back from Long-Island to New-York? Had the Admiral destroyed any one of them? Could they wish for more than three days leisure,

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to collect and add to them all the vessels in New-York, and the adjacent places, to carry them off? Could he think, that they would not exert their utmost diligence to save themselves from the destruction which they hourly expected.

Instances do not often occur, of a general's vigilance being thus eluded. And we may justly wonder, that a whole army of twelve or fourteen thousand men, with almost all their baggage, and stores, should move off, across an arm of the sea twelve hundred yards over, without the General or Admiral's knowing any thing of the matter; that their very centinels, to say nothing of their artillery, should be drawn off, and our advanced centinels give no notice of it. There are, indeed, who say——But let others write what they hear——I would confine myself to the General's own account of his suffering them thus to escape.

From

From the file and sentiments of this letter, and the conduct of this whole campaign, the great misfortune seems to have been an apprehension, that the art of war, and the office of a general, consisted, not so much in routing and taking the enemy's army, as in getting the ground they stood on. If they would but quit that, they were always suffered to go off to any other, where they pleased. I may hereafter illustrate this, in the instances of the landing on the island of New-York:* And in the halting the army, and suspending the attack at the White-Plains,

* Without entering into anecdotes, of which many might be recited, the reader need only look upon the map, and see this matter with his own eyes. The landing, we are told, was at Kepp's Bay, three miles to the north of New-York; and the troops immediately marched up, and took possession of the high grounds before them. From thence they had a full view across the island to the North River, over an open plain of less than two miles, without woods or hedges to intercept their view. The rebels had thrown up entrenchments all round the island, but at New-York they had two strong redoubts; which, with the entrenchments to the south of Kepp's Bay, required several thousand men. These must all have passed through the valley underneath, in the view of our troops, in order to retreat to the rest of their army to the northward. The presenting to an enemy the flank of a line of march has always been reckoned a very dangerous movement: but, if the object proposed be to get possession of the ground they stood on, there can then be no reason for intercepting them: and the more easily they are allowed to go off, the sooner is the end obtained. Is it possible to account for the troops remaining on the heights, and seeing the Americans quietly march away along the valley underneath, upon any other principle? In the evening (after the three last regiments had passed by) the army occupied, we are told, the whole breadth of the island, from Bloomingdale to Horenhook; and the General had the satisfaction of having

till the enemy was moved off. Should the reader think this a mere surmise, let him read only the manner in which the General and Admiral both relate it.

“ As it was apparent the lines must have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular approaches, I would not risque the loss that might have been sustained in the assault;” and agreeably hereto, he afterwards tells us, “ In the evening of the 27th, the army encamped in front of the enemy’s work. On the 28th, at night, broke ground at six hundred yards distant from a redoubt upon their left; and on the 29th, at night, the rebels evacuated their intrenchments, near Redhook, with the utmost silence, and quitted Governor’s-Island the following evening, leaving their cannon and a quantity of stores

having the city of New-York in his possession. After having suffered the rebels to escape out of one island, it might have been hoped, that double care would have been used to secure them in the next. Under these circumstances, is it possible to account for our making only three hundred prisoners? Could we possibly have escaped the taking as many thousand; if it had not been apparent, they would leave us the ground they stood on, and that their lines and intrenchments at a very cheap rate would be ours.

in all their works. At day-break, on the 30th, their flight was discovered, and the picquets of the line took possession." Not a word is said of the manner of their making this escape, or of the cause of the General's suffering it: but upon their flight being discovered, the picquets took possession of the lines; and that it seems was all which was wanted.

One of the greatest military achievements of the Prince of Parma's life, was his conveying his army across the Sein, after being shut up by the French in a peninsula of that river. No victory was more celebrated at the time, or thought more glorious to *him*; and nothing ever happened more mortifying to Henry the Fourth, than the suffering him thus to escape. But our sea and land commanders suffer a *beaten* army, instead of a *victorious* one, to ferry over an arm of the sea, without making any the least apology. The General having at his own

cheap rate gotten possession of the lines, seems quite at ease; and, far from expressing any mortification at their escape, treats their flight out of the island as rather a matter of triumph.

The noble Admiral's account runs in much the same strain. " Being informed by General Howe of his intention to advance that night to the enemy's lines, and of his wishes, that some diversion might be attempted by the ships on this side, I gave direction to Sir Peter Parker for proceeding higher up in the channel towards the town of New-York next morning, with the *Asia*, *Renown*, *Preston*, *Roebuck*, and *Repulse*; and to keep those ships in readiness for being employed, as occasion might require; but the wind veering to the northward soon after the break of day, the ships could not be moved up to the distance pro-

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posed ; therefore when the corps under General Grant, forming the left column of the army, were seen to be engaged with the enemy in the morning, the Roebuck, Captain Hammond, leading the detached squadron, was the only ship that could fetch high enough to the northward, to exchange a few random shot with the battery on Red-Hook ; and the ebb making strongly down the river soon after, I ordered the signal to be shewn for the squadron to anchor.

“ On the night of the 29th, the rebels abandoned all their posts and works on Long-Island, and retired with great precipitation across the east river to the town of New-York.”

If a crow had fled over the passage, could he have spoken of it with a calmer indifference ?

The reader will observe, that the journal of the fleet's proceedings ends on the 26th : whether, and which way the wind veered during the three following days, is not said. All which we, at this distance, can know, is, if the tide of ebb made it necessary to cast anchor, to prevent the ships being carried down ; that in those three days there were six tides of flood to carry them up.

The rebel intrenchments at Red-Hook made one of their strongest posts : being intended to guard the right flank of the lines. And the order of the General's narration may lead us to think, that the evacuation of this post was made previous to their other motions. If so, it was a clear indication of their intention to abandon all the rest,

How this evacuation was effected ; whether by an embarkation in vessels there, or by a march to those at Brooklyn, is not said. But in either case the profound secrecy of it seems equally mysterious. The ships lay nearly within cannon-shot ; and it may be thought that in a moonlight night, the break of the water, and the motion of the sails could not have been unperceived.

But the discovery, we are told, of the evacuation of the works was made all at the same time. The reader will think what an amazing embarkation this must have been : but let him not compare the pompous account of our 1st, 2d, and 3d division in going *to* the Island, with the perfect silence of this embarkation *from* it.

This very great transportation must appear still greater ; if, beside the troops, they
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took their cannon and stores along with them. But the letter tells us, that the rebels quitted their entrenchments near Red-Hook, &c. leaving their cannon, and a quantity of stores, in all their works. A quantity of stores may mean a part of the stores; and there were some French chests of medicines, and other things found in them, beside the iron shot and tools so particularly enumerated. But the expression, *leaving their cannon in all their works*, manifestly leads us to conclude, that they did not take any away.

If this was the case, and we look to the list of the cannon taken, in what a contemptible light must all these lines, redoubts, and batteries appear. The brass pieces were taken in the rout of the 26th. From that day therefore to the 29th, a great army, with forty pieces of artillery, beside their field equi-

equipage, attended by a fleet carrying many hundred guns, are all stopp'd in the full career of victory, and kept in awe for three days together, by lines, redoubts, and batteries of three miles extent, containing all of them put together only twenty-six pieces of iron ordnance.

The rebel account of this affair may perhaps relieve the reader's astonishment. According to that, they *did* leave the cannon in Governor's-Island; and so did *we* leave it too: till the rebels at New-York had time to recover their fright; and some days after, finding that we did not chuse to take it, sent off their boats, and brought away all the useful part of it to New-York.*

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* Two days after Governor's-Island had been abandoned by our people, which lay much exposed to the enemy, the train went and brought off every thing, through a heavy fire from their batteries on Long-Island,

Should any still think it impossible, but that in all that extent of Island-batteries, lines, and redoubts, there must have been a much greater number than only twenty-six pieces of ordnance, such persons must suppose, that this expression of their *leaving their cannon in all their works*, means that they carried off the chief part of it along with them: and consequently, that the number of vessels must have been so much the greater.

All these various movements, necessarily attending the retreat and embark-

Island, and the men of war, which had by this time hauled up nearer the town. It is very extraordinary, that the enemy let forty-eight hours elapse, without going on the island, after we had evacuated. It was certainly a lucky circumstance for us, for had we left the cannon there, which were some of the best we had, it must have been felt. *Extract of the New-York account of the battle.* Dated Boston, Sept. 19.

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ment of ten or twelve thousand men, with the best part of their cannon, baggage and stores, were performed, without any the least interruption from either army or fleet, which lay so near : and that too on the very night of a full-moon.

I do not however put the dilemma. Either the ships, on one of the foregoing days, could have pushed up beyond the ferry, and prevented that vast transportation ; or, they could not ; because I suppose, that the batteries on the two shores, and on Governor's-Island, rendered it impracticable. But then the General could not but know this. And the public might have expected, that he would have pressed the enemy so much the more, and given them no time to escape from him at *land* ; since he knew that he could not intercept

tercept their passage at *sea*. Most men would have thought it necessary to make some apology for the having let them thus get away for want of it. The letter, however, does not intimate the least apprehension of that kind. Far from hinting any apology, it expresses the most joyful self-complacency and public gratulation. He had gained his point at even a cheaper rate than he proposed. The army, after three days waiting for them, had got the lines: the rebels indeed, after three days sweating for them, had got their lives: but the General's prophecy was fulfilled, and *the lines were ours*. The nation surely need not repent the having put this gentleman at the head of an American establishment for fifty-four thousand troops, attended with ninety-six ships of war, after so very noble an acquisition.

F I N I S.

Many gentlemen can't easily turn to an old Gazette, and I have therefore printed this at large, omitting only the particulars of the rebel prisoners, and the names of our own killed and wounded, which cannot be material.

THE

THE LONDON GAZETTE
EXTRAORDINARY.

Whitehall, October 10, 1776.

“ THIS morning Major Cuyler, first Aid de Camp to the Honourable General Howe, arrived with the following letter from General Howe to Lord George Germaine.

Camp at Newtown, Long Island, Sep. 3, 1776.

“ MY LORD,

“ On the 22d of last month, in the morning, the British, with Colonel Donop's corps of Chasseurs and Hessian Grenadiers, disembarked near Utrecht on Long Island without opposition, the whole being landed, with forty pieces of cannon, in two hours and a half, under the direction of Commodore Hotham; Lieutenant-General Clin-

ton commanding the first division of the troops.

“ The enemy had only small parties on the coast, who, upon the approach of the boats, retired to the woody heights, commanding a principal pass on the road from Flatbush to their works at Brooklyn. Lord Cornwallis was immediately detached to Flatbush with the reserve, two battalions of light-infantry, and Colonel Donop's corps, with six field-pieces, having orders not to risk an attack upon the pass if he should find it occupied; which proving to be the case, his Lordship took post in the village, and the army extended from the ferry at the Narrows, through Utrecht and Gravesend, to the village at Flatland.

“ On the 25th, Lieutenant-general de Heister, with two brigades of Hessians from

from Staten-Island, joined the army, leaving one brigade of his troops, a detachment of the 14th regiment from Virginia, some convalefcents and recruits, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Dalrymple, for the security of that island.

“ On the 26th, Lieutenant-general de Heister took post at Flatbush, and in the evening Lord Cornwallis with the British drew off to Flatland. About nine o'clock the same night, the van of the army, commanded by Lieutenant-general Clinton, consisting of the light-dragoons and brigade of light-infantry, the reserve, under the command of Lord Cornwallis, except the 42d regiment, which was posted to the left of the Hessians, the 1st brigade and the 71st regiment, with 14 field-pieces, began to move from Flatland, across the country through the new lots, to seize a pass in the heights,

heights, extending from east to west along the middle of the island, and about three miles from Bedford on the road to Jamaica, in order to turn the enemy's left, posted at Flatbush.

“ General Clinton being arrived within half a mile of the pass, about two hours before day-break, halted, and settled his disposition for the attack. One of his patrols, falling in with a patrol of the enemy's officers, took them; and the General learning from their information, that the rebels had not occupied the pass, detached a battalion of light-infantry to secure it, and, advancing with his corps upon the first appearance of day, possessed himself of the heights, with such a disposition as must have ensured success, had he found the enemy in force to oppose him.

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“ The main body of the army, consisting of the guards, 2d, 3d, and 5th brigades, with ten field-pieces, led by Lord Piercy, marched soon after General Clinton, and halted an hour before day in his rear. This column (the country not admitting of two columns of march) was followed by the 49th regiment, with four medium 12 pounders, and the baggage closed the rear with a separate guard.

“ As soon as these corps had passed the heights, they halted for the soldiers to take a little refreshment, after which the march was continued, and about half an hour after eight o'clock, having got to Bedford, in the rear of the enemy's left, the attack was commenced by the light-infantry and light dragoons upon large bodies of the rebels, having cannon, who were quitting the woody heights before-mentioned to return to their
lines,

lines, upon discovering the march of the army ; instead of which they were drove back, and the army still moving on to gain the enemy's rear, the grenadiers and 33d regiment being in front of the column, soon approached within musquet shot of the enemy's lines at Brooklyn, from whence these battalions, without regarding the fire of cannon and small arms upon them, pursued numbers of the rebels that were retiring from the heights so close to their principal redoubt, and with such eagerness to attack it by storm, that it required repeated orders to prevail upon them to desist from the attempt. Had they been permitted to go on, it is my opinion they would have carried the redoubt ; but as it was apparent the lines must have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular approaches, I would not risk the loss that might have been sustained in the assault, and ordered them back to a hollow way,

in the front of the works, out of the reach of musquetry.

“ Lieutenant-general de Heister began, soon after day-break, to cannonade the enemy in his front, and, upon the approach of our right, ordered Colonel Donop's corps to advance to the attack of the hill, following himself at the head of the brigades. The light-infantry about that time having been reinforced by the light company, the grenadier company, and two other companies of the guards, who joined them with the greatest activity and spirit, had taken three pieces of cannon, and were warmly engaged with very superior numbers in the woods, when, on the Hessians advancing, the enemy gave way, and was entirely routed in that quarter.

“ On the left, Major-General Grant, having the 4th and 6th brigades, the 42d
F regiment,

regiment, and two companies of New-York provincials, raised by Governor Tryon in the spring, advanced along the coast with ten pieces of cannon, to divert the enemy's attention from the left. About midnight, he fell in with their advanced parties, and at day-break with a large corps, having cannon, and advantageously posted, with whom there was skirmishing and a cannonade for some hours, until by the firing at Brooklyn, the rebels, suspecting their retreat would be cut off, made a movement to their right, in order to secure it across a swamp and creek that covered the right of their works; but being met in their way by a part of the 2d grenadiers, who were soon after supported by the 71st regiment, and General Grant's left coming up, they suffered considerably: numbers of them, however, did get into the morass, where many were suffocated or drowned.

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" The force the enemy detached from the lines where General Putnam commanded, was not less, from the best accounts I have had, that 10,000 men, who were under the orders of Major-general Sullivan, Brigadier-generals Lord Stirling and Udell. Their loss is computed to be about 3300 killed, wounded, prisoners, and drowned; with five field-pieces and one howitzer taken. A return of the prisoners is inclosed.

" On the part of the King's troops, five officers and 56 non-commissioned officers, and rank and file killed; 12 officers and 245 non-commissioned officers, and rank and file, wounded; one officer and 20 grenadiers of the marines taken, by mistaking them for the Hessians.

“ The Hessians had two privates killed, three officers, and 23 rank and file, wounded. The wounds are in general very slight. Lieutenant-colonel Monckton is shot thro’ the body, but there is the greatest hopes of his recovery.

“ The behaviour of both officers and foldiers, British and Hessians, was highly to their honour. More determined courage and steadiness in troops have never been experienced, or a greater ardour to distinguish themselves, as all those who had an opportunity have amply evinced by their actions.

“ In the evening of the 27th, the army encamped in front of the enemy’s works. On the 28th, at night, broke ground 600 yards distant from a redoubt upon their left, and on the 29th, at night, the rebels eva-

evacuated their entrenchments, near Redhook, with the utmost silence, and quitted Governor's-Island the following evening, leaving their cannon and a quantity of stores in all their works. At day-break, on the 30th, their flight was discovered, the picquets of the line took possession; and those most advanced reached the shore opposite to New-York as their rear-guard was going over, and fired some shot among them.

“ The enemy is still in possession of the town and island of New-York, in force, and making demonstration of opposing us in their works on both sides of King's-bridge.

“ The inhabitants of this island, many of whom have been forced into rebellion, have all submitted, and are ready to take the oaths of allegiance.

“ This

“ This dispatch will be delivered to your Lordship by Major Cuyler, my first aide-de-camp, who I trust will be able to give your Lordship such further information as may be required. I have the honour to be, &c.

W. HOWE.

“ P. S. I have omitted to take notice, in its proper place, of a movement made by the King's ships towards the town on the 27th, at day-break, with a view of drawing off the attention of the enemy from our real design, which, I believe, effectually answered the intended purpose.

“ *Return of prisoners taken on Long-Island, 27th August, 1776.*

Generals	—	—	3
Colonels	—	—	3
			—
		Carried over	6
		Brought	9

	Brought over	6
Lieutenant colonels	—	4
Majors	—	3
Captains	—	18
Lieutenants	—	43
Ensigns	—	11
Adjutant	—	1
Surgeons	—	2
Volunteers	—	2
Privates	—	1006
	Total	1096

“ Return of brass and iron ordnance taken from the enemy in the engagement on the 27th of August, 1776, and found in their different redoubts on Long-Island and Governor’s-Island.

“ Camp at Newtown, Sept. 3, 1776.

“ Brass Ordnance, taken in the engagement 27th August, 1776. 1 five and-half-inch howitzer; 4 six-pounders; 1 three-pounder. Total of the brass ordnance, 6.

“ Iron Ordnance, found in the different forts on Long-Island and Governor’s-Island. 6 thirty-two pounders; 1 twenty-four-pounder; 4 eighteen pounders; 2 twelve

twelve pounders ; 2 nine pounders ; 8 six pounders ; ~~3~~ three pounders. Total of iron ordnance, 26.

" A quantity of shot, shells, ammunition, trenching tools, small arms, a number of long pikes, ammunition carts, and many other articles not at present ascertained.

(Signed)

W. HOWE, Commander in Chief.

" Return of the killed, wounded and missing.

" One lieutenant colonel, 3 captains, 1 lieutenant, 3 serjeants, and 53 rank and file, killed.

" One lieutenant colonel, 3 captains, 8 lieutenants, 11 serjeants, 3 drummers, 251 rank and file, wounded.

" One lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 29 rank and file, missing."

" Admiralty-Office, Oct. 10, 1776.

" Extract of a letter from Lord Viscount Howe, vice-admiral of the white, and commander in chief of his Majesty's ships in North,

North-America, to Mr. Stephens, dated on board the Eagle, off Bedlow's-Island, New-York, the 31st of August, 1776.

“ On the 19th instant, Captain Parker in the Phoenix, with the Rose, Captain Wallace, and Tryal armed schooner, Lieutenant Brown, taking advantage of a fresh easterly wind, returned from the north-river through the fire of the enemy's several batteries, and joined the fleet off Staten-Island without any loss.

“ The spirit and perseverance of this small squadron will be explained to their Lordship's by Captain Parker's journal.

“ General Howe giving me notice of his intention to make a descent in Gravesend-bay, on Long-Island, on the morning of the 22d the necessary disposition

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was made, and seventy-five flat boats, with eleven batteaux, and two gallies, built for the occasion, were prepared for that service.

“ The command of the whole remained with Commodore Hotham. The Captains Parker, Wallace, and Dickson, in the Phoenix, Rose, and Greyhound, with the Thunder and Carcase bombs, under the direction of Colonel James, were appointed to cover the landing.

“ The flat boats, gallies, and three batteaux, manned from the ships of war, were formed into divisions commanded respectively by the Captains Vandeput, Mason, Curtis, Caldwell, Phipps, Caulfield, Uppleby, and Duncan, and Lieutenant Reeve of the Eagle. The rest of the batteaux, making a tenth division, manned from the

trans-

transports, were under the conduct of Lieutenant Bristow, an assistant agent.

“ Early in the morning of the 22d, the covering ships took their stations in Gravesend-Bay. The light-infantry, with the reserve, to be first landed, forming a corps together of 4000 men, entered the boats at Staten-Island the same time.

“ The transports in which the several brigades composed the second debarkation (about 5000 men) had been before embarked, were moved down and suitably arranged without the covering ships by eight o'clock. The first debarkation not meeting with any opposition, the second succeeded immediately after; and the other transports, carrying the rest of the troops, following the former in proper succession. The whole force then destined for this service, consist-

ing of about 15,000 men, was landed before noon.

“ On the diligence and utility of Captain Bourmaster, and the other agents of the transports on that occasion, too much commendation cannot be bestowed.

“ On the 25th, an additional corps of Hessian troops, under General Heister, with their field artillery and baggage, were conveyed over to Gravesend-Bay.

“ Being informed the next day, by General Howe, of his intentions to advance with the army that night to the enemy's lines, and of his wishes that some diversion might be attempted by the ships on this side, I gave direction to Sir Peter Parker for proceeding higher up in the channel towards the town of New-York next morn-

ing, with the *Asia*, *Renown*, *Preston*,
 (Commodore Hotham embarked in the
Phoenix, having been left to carry on the
 service in Gravesend-Bay) *Roebuck* and
Repulse, and to keep those ships in readi-
 ness for being employed as occasion might
 require; but the wind veering to the
 northward soon after the break of day, the
 ships could not be moved up to the distance
 proposed; therefore when the corps under
 General Grant, forming the left column of
 the army, were seen to be engaged with the
 enemy in the morning, the *Roebuck*, Cap-
 tain Hamond, leading the detached squa-
 dron, was the only ship that could fetch
 high enough to the northward to exchange
 a few random shot with the battery on Red-
 Hook, and the ebb making strongly down
 the river soon after, I ordered the signal to
 be shewn for the squadron to anchor.

“ It

“ It was observed, that as soon as the centre column of the army was seen to have turned the flank of the enemy's line opposed to General Grant, they immediately attempted to make their retreat within their works, but they suffered great loss, both in the number killed and made prisoners.

“ On the night of the 29th the rebels abandoned all their posts and works on Long-Island, and retired with great precipitation across the east river to the town of New-York.”



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